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. . to the waiver of the requirement of a bond for costs if such waiver is
necessary to the presentation of his appeal."'
This decision will have the general effect of tending to eliminate any
*

instances where a defendant convicted of a crime is prevented from appealing to the appellate court of his state solely on the ground that he is not
financially able to purchase a transcript of the trial record, put up security
for an appellate bond, or pass any other finaneial burdle erected by the

laws of his state. This result is desirable" and the case will undoubtedly
hasten the time when all of the states will have a simple, efficient system of
allowing an indigent full appellate review of his conviction in a criminal
court, where there is merit in his appeal.'
If the Court really meant that
this was an equal protection question, as well as a due process question, both
concepts of constitutional guarantees were extended into the new area of
economic inequality, where the possibilities of application are virtually unlimited.
GEORGE DALTHORP

CORPORATIONS-CUMULATIVE

VOTING-STAGGERED ELECTIONS AND CLAS-

SIFICATION OF DIRECTORS--Louis Wolfson, a minority owner of common stock

of Montgomery Ward and Co., and in the midst of a proxy fight with the
management for the control of the board of directors, had protested to the
defendant, Sewell Avery, that the by-law of Montgomery Ward which
authorized the election of only one-third of the company's nine directors
each year was illegal. Subsequently he brought action seeking a declaratory
judgment to the effect that a provision of the Illinois Constitution guaranteeing the right to vote cumulatively in the election of corporate directors

was violated by the Illinois Business Corporation Act, section 35,' and the

"The

court is probably right. "Surely no one would contend that either a state or
the Federal Government could constitutionally provide that defendants unable to
pay court costs in advance should be denied the right... to defend themselves in
court.... There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies
the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to
pay the costs in advance." Instant case at 17.
"The following are possible objections to the decision: (1) The decision is an example of federal meddling in state affairs. But the states are not free to deprive their
citizens of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. (2) It will impose great
expense on the states. Since a majority of the states do make provisions for furnishing indigents with transcripts, the others should be able to, also. In addition
there may be other ways in which a state may allow an indigent to appeal which
are less expensive. (3) It may result in the states' limiting the right to appeal.
This seems unlikely since society has come to consider appeals as essentially a right.
(4) Prisoners now in confinement will ask for free transcripts so they may appeal
also. Practically forbids the states' allowing this. One rationalization is that the
prisoners waived their right to a free transcript by not making a timely request.
Perhaps a more realistic one is that the decision is effective only for the future and
is not retroactive, being in fact a new rule rathef than a discovery of what has always been the law.
'The majority opinion states that the petitioners had alleged that there were errors
in the trial which entitled them to have their convictions set aside on appeal and
that these allegations were not denied. Therefore, it was assumed that there was
merit in the appeal in the instant case. It is a teasonable conclusion that this decision may apply only where there is apparently merit in an appeal.
'ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3.

'ILT- ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.35 (1954).
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company's by-law enacted pursuant thereto, which authorized the division
of corporate boards of nine or more directors into two or three classes for
the purpose of elections, and the election of only one class annually. The
lower court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings,
and declared section 35 and the by-law of the company in conflict with a
constitutional provision and therefore invalid. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Illinois, held, affirmed. The practice of classification and staggered elections is unconstitutional because it directly infringes upon the
right of cumulative voting granted by the Illinois Constitution and denies
representation proportionate to stock ownership. Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill.
2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955) (Justice Hershey dissenting).
Historically, the right to vote is an incident of stock ownership and is
a valuable right, affording the stockholder a voice in the management of the
corporation. Under the common law each stockholder was limited to one
vote regardless of the number of' shares that he owned. Subsequently, however, statutes were enacted giving stockholders a more equitable representation by allowing them one vote for each share of stock that was held. These
statutes were designed to eliminate the unfairness brought about by allowing a party with one share of stock the same voting power as someone holding 1000 shares. Since the system allowed one vote per director for each
share of stock that was owned, those who controlled 51 per cent of the outstanding stock were able to elect the entire board of directors, while the
minority, possessing some 49 per cent of the stock were not represented at
all.
Then about the middle of the nineteenth century, there arose a second
theory of corporate control, that of minority representation and minority
rights. The proponents of this school of thought asserted that the minority
had a right to representation on the board of directors in order to provide
a method of checking on the actions of the majority in control. This theory
arose shortly after the Civil War, largely as a result of public indignation
over the current business scandals, excesseg and frauds perpetrated by
corporate management. Publisher Joseph Medill of the Chicago Tribune
was running a continual attack upon the management of corporations. In
one such editorial he pointed out that if the four-ninths of the stock of the
Erie Railroad which was held by opponents of Fisk and Gould had been allowed any representation at all, quite possibly the Erie scandal could have
been prevented. -So, as the delegates gathered for the Illinois constitutional
convention, one of the chief topics of discussion was how to curb the power
of the rings that ran the corporations and had muleted thousands of Small
investors.,: In 187.0 the reformation forces, led by that strong delegate, publisher Medill, succeeded in having the 6nvention adopi, the ,princ6iple of
cumulative voting, and so it was in the Illinois Constitution that the principle of cumulative voting was first ushered into the field of American law.
The constitutional provision was adopted almost verbatim from the draft
proposed by Medill, and it provided that a stockholder is entitled to as
many votes as he has shares of stock, multiplied by the number of directors
who are to be elected. He may concentrate all of his votes on one candidate,
or distribute them among as many candidates as he sees fit. Under this syshttps://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/4
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tern of voting, holders of 49 per cent of the voting stock can elect four
of a board of nine directors.'
Following the lead of Illinois, cumulative voting in corporate elections
has been made mandatory by constitutional provisions in twelve other
states,' and by statute in seven more.' In addition, twenty states' have
statutes authorizing pernmissive cumulative voting.' Of the thirteen states
that have mandatory cumnlative voting by constitutional. provision, seven of
them permit by statute the dividing of the board of directors into classes,
and the election of only one or more classes each year.' Of the seven that
have mandatory cumulative voting by statute, five allow classification and
staggered elections.! All twenty of the states which provide for permissive
cumulative voting authorize the classified boards and staggered elections."
Although other states ' have constitutional provisions and statutes sufficiently similar to raise the same problem, the only system of classification
previously questioned was a division of a board of directors into classes consisting of one director in each class, with the election of only one class annually. The California court in Wright v. Central CaliforniaColony Water
Co." decided that this single election of a single director completely circumvented the principle of cumulative voting, as you can have no cumulative
voting if only one director is to be elected. The Ohio appellate court upheld
this principle in Hmphrys v. Winous ;" however, the decision of the appellate court was later reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court," which held
that the statute granting the right of cumulative voting conferred only that
right, and did not undertake to guarantee minority representation.
The Wolfson case appears to be the first reported decision in which the
entire principle of classification and staggered elections was challenged.
For 83 years the question had not arisen in Illinois, and, except for the
California and Ohio decisions, had received scant judicial attention elsewhere. The provision of the Illinois Constitution over which the Wolfson
case arose was the statement that "every stockholder shall have the right to
vote

for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected,

'See Stephan, Cunlative Voting wnd Classified Boards: Some Reflections on Wolf-

son v. Avery, 31 NOaRE DAME LAW. 351 (1956), for an extensive discussion of the
history prior to the Wolfson decision, and an analysis of the pros and cons of cumulitive voting and classified boards. Mr. Stephan was the attorney for plaintiff
Wolfson.
'Ariz., Idaho, Ky., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.D., Pa., S.C., S.D., W.Va.
5Ark., Cal., Kan., Mich., Ohio, Wash., Wyo.
'Colo., Del., Fla., Ind., La., Md., Minn., Nev. N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y:, N.C., Okla., Ore.,
R.I., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Va.

'In the'absence of such express provision, a stockholder has no right to vote cumulatively. 'Ini re. American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 265 N.Y. 416, 193 N.E. 253, 43
A;L.R.2d 1342 (1934) ; State.eo rel. Baumgardner v. Stockley, 45 Ohio' St. 304, 13
N.E. 279, (1887):; Statee rel. Siahson v. Perham, 36 Wash. 2d 368; 191 P.2d 689,
1,3 Ws.2
6, 9 .d69
(1948)...•.. . .........
'Ky., Mo., Mont., N.D., Pa., W.Va.; Illinois did prior to the Wolfson case.
'Ark., Kan., Mich., Ohio, Wash.

"0See note 6 supra.
'Montana, Nebraska and West Virginia have similar constitutional provisions and

classification statutes.
1'67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885).
1125 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio App. 1955)
'Humphrys v. Winous, 165 Ohio St. 45, 133 N.E.2d 780 (1956).
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or to cumulate.. . [his] shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the
number of directors multiplied by the number of shares.' "' There is no doubt
that the language of the section is ambiguous.'6 The Illinois court, after
considerable discussion, concluded that the words "to be elected" did not
qualify the words "number of directors'-' and thus reached its decision.
However, the court in reaching its decision was not simply making an interpretation of the language of the Illinois Constitution, but was faced with
the question whether the drafters of the constitution desired that the minority stockholders should have proportional representation or just some representation. The court in answering this question asked themselves: Was it
probable that the constitutional convention, after providing for the right of
cumlative voting, intended to subject it to the limitations and restrictions
of classification and staggered elections? To this question they answered,
no."
Just what effect does the practice of allowing classification and staggered elections have on the right of cumulative voting? Assume that, for
example, you have a corporation with a nine man board of directors, elected
annually. It would take ten per cent of the stock plus one share to elect one
director voting cumlatively.' However, if the board is classified into equal
groups of three, each group having a three year term, and each group elected
on a different year, then it would take 25 per cent of the stock plus one share
to elect one director. Thus, it can be seen that where, as in the example
above, you allow classification of directors and staggered elections, it
would take 150 per cent more stock for a minority stockholder to elect one
director than if all nine directors were elected simultaneously.
'IiL. CoNsT art. XI, § 3 (emphasis added).
"Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illbois Busine8s Corporations Act, 1 U. CH.
L. Rsv. 357, 385 (1934). Ballantine, in reviewing this provision, placed a question
mark after the words "to be elected," indicating that he was unsure of their meaning.
"The tendency of the Illinois court has been to construe strictly Article XI, § 3 of
their constitution which reads as follows: "The general assembly shall provide,
by law, that in all elections for directors or managers of incorporated companies,
every stockholder shall have the right to vote, in person or by proxy, for the number
of shares of stock owned by him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many
votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock
shall equal, or to distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates
as he shall think fit; and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any
other manner." The Illinois court had previously decided in People v. Emmerson,
302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922), that this section prohibited the issuance of nonvoting stock. And in People v. Cohn, 339 Ill. 121, 171 N.E. 159 (1930), the court
had decided that the language of the section precluded the board of directors from
appointing a new director to the board to serve out an unexpired term of a deceased
or resigned director, and said that the vacancy must be filled by an- election by the
stockholders. While the above two limitations were clearly not part of the express
language of the provision and were read into the section by the court, there is no
doubt but that the language did expressly deal with the question of cumulative voting, and that the court was on much firmer ground in the Wolfson case than in the
previous ones. It is easily discernible that the court's interpretation of the language of the section in the Wolfson case was merely another step in line with, this
tendency.
"The formula for computing the amount of stock needed to elect each director by
cumulative voting is as follows:
(X=shares needed to elect a single director,
X
Y
11
l pls
plus

Y-total
of, shares
voting,
N-number
of directors
to be elected).

WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR Dinc'roRs 41 (1951).
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The dissent in the Wolfson case points out several arguments for the
theory of coexistence of cumulative voting and staggered elections and classification. It states that the idea, that cumulative voting and staggered
elections and classification cannot both be given effect, could only be true
if staggering and cumulating were contradictory or mutually exclusive.
But, it contends, they are not inconsistent or incompatible, as both may
clearly exist at the same time, since at some percentages more directors can
be elected by the minority stockholders at staggered elections than by electing them all at once. 9 Thus, the dissent contends, cumulative voting and
classification and staggered elections can coexist, and together they bring
about continuity of company policies and assure that there will always be
experienced directors on the board. It cites, as further evidence, that cumulative voting, staggered elections, and a classified board are recommended
in the Model Business CorporationAct ;' that in various federally chartered
associations they are made mandatory; and that the practice is allowed in
32 other states.2'
The Wolfson decision has a special interest in Montana. The Montana
constitutional provision on cumulative voting ' is almost verbatim that of
Illinois. Montana also has a statute providing for classification of directors
and their election to different terms. ' However, while the Montana constitutional provision is almost identical with that of Illinois, the statute on
classification and staggered terms differs considerably. ' The Montana
statute, in part, provides for "the several classes to be elected for different
terms. ' This phrase is very ambiguous in that it is impossible to ascertain whether the legislature meant that each class shall have terms of different lengths, or that just the first class elected after the corporation begins
using a classified board shall have terms of a different length. Montana
also has a statute providing that the size of the board will be "not less than
three nor more than thirteen directors. "' Therefore, in Montana it is possible (and may even exist), that a three man board of directors could be
divided into three classes of one director each, and each class could be elected
separately. Clearly this would be in direct violation of the Montana constitutional provision of cumulative voting, for you can have no cumulative
voting if only one director is to be elected. '
Just what effect should the Wolfson decision have on Montana and on
other jurisdictions? In those states where both cumulative votinge and
classification of directors! were made possible by the legislature, the Wolf'One example is 30% of the voting stock held by minority stockholders. If there is
a nine man board elected all at one time, then by voting cumulatively you could
elect two directors. However, if the board is divided into three classes of three di-

rectors each, and one class elected each time, then you could elect one each time for

a total of three.
'*9 UNIFoRM LAws ANN. 52.
"See notes 6, 8, and 9 8upra.
"MONT. CONST. art. XV, § 4.
"REvIszr CODES OF MONTANA, 1947,
-R.C.M. 1947, § 15-402.

§ 15-402. Also mentioned in R.C.M. 1947, § 15-403.

251bid.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 15-401.

'See Note 5 supra.
"See note 9

supra.

'See notes 4 and 8 supra.
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son decision should not have a controlling effect. For that which the legislature gives, the legislature can take away or modify, and the problem becomes simply one of statutory interpretation. However, a substantially different and much more difficult question arises in those states, as in
Montana, where the right to vote cumulatively has been conferred by constitutional provision.' In Illinois, the constitutional provision was adopted
as a result of public indignation over the excesses of corporate directors, and
the court in the Wolfson case based its opinion, in large part, on the fact
that cumulative voting was adopted in Illinois as an expression of strong
public policy. The courts of the states with similar constitutional provisions, if and when the question arises, will have to probe into and examine
the history behind the adoption of their constitutional provisions, and if
they find, as the Illinois court did, that their provision arose as a result of
strong public policy and was designed to guarantee minority representation
on corporate boards, the Wolfson decision should become controlling. If, on
the other hand, the courts find that the provision was adopted merely with
the idea of providing the right to vote cumulatively, then they would be
justified in either following or disregarding the Wolfson decision.
It is difficult to determine what stand the Montana Supreme Court
would take in deciding the question posed by the Wolfson case. Its decision would involve two factors: First, a determination of the public policy
the constitutional convention intended to embody in the constitutional provision; and second, a consideration of the relative merits of the two theories.
It is doubtful that history will reveal the intent of the constitutional convention.' Therefore the decision would probably be based upon the merits
of the two theories, coupled, of course, with whatever evidence may be available of the intent of the convention.
DOUGLAS P. BEIGHLE

INCOME TAX-CHARITABLE
ING

DEDUCTIONS-PROPAGANDA

AND INFLUENC-

LEGISLATION-During the years 1946 to 1949, petitioners had deducted

severally and jointly in their Federal Income Tax returns contributions
made in those years to the Hamilton County Good Government League, incorporated as a non-profit corporation to provide an opportunity for discussion of matters of civic importance and to advance good government. It
had neither contributed to, nor affiliated with any political party, but had
urged its members to vote and to support legislation that was for the public
good. In addition, committee members of the League were personally responsible for making studies of necessary legislation to effect public pur-,
poses, and for making endorsements of political candidates to the League,
but these activities involved no expenditure of League funds. Less then
five per cent of the time and effort of the League was found to be of a political nature. The Tax Court disallowed deductions to the League under
80

Wright v. Central Calif. Colony Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885).

'For an interesting discussion of the possible intent of the Montana Constitutional
Convention when they adopted this provision, and dealing specifically with the question of non-voting stock in Montana, see Note, 1 MONTANA L. REv. 60 (1940).
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